Conceptualising *Postcolonial Denmark. Nation-narration in a Crisis-Ridden Europe.* A local(ised) guide to postcolonial terminology

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As academic authors and book editors know the near completion of a manuscript is marked by putting together an index. A laborious task forcing the author to think through which words create the spinal cord of the book’s argument.¹ What is less clear from their listing is how they come to mean what they mean. Their listing decontextualizes them - even as the indexing represents a way of identifying them with their reference. References in the text to other texts provide guidelines to what other scholars have thought about a particular term or issue, but remain implicit.

Beginning an article with observations like these is prone to scare more readers away than attract potential new ones. Yet it was the indexing process that forced me to think in a different, less narrative-chronological order, that is, a less sequential reading of my narrative. It opened for a more pattern conscious or matrix-oriented approach to my work and what I wanted to address with it. This article will not go exhaustively through the index, let alone its different categories. Instead, I will discuss terms singled out for their thematic importance for the book. It enables me to produce a different logic which lays out my book’s overriding concerns on the one hand while on the other hand it opens for a dialogue between the usages of the different central concepts. As such, it is best regarded as a companion article for the book.

**Amnesia (colonial).** I came across the term amnesia in relation to the nation’s strategic forgetting of its colonial history in a number of different postcolonial European settings. Colonial amnesia is typically characterised as setting in, or induced (but then by whom?), in the wake of the loss of the colonies. As such, the term reveals the loss of colonies as a national trauma, but this interpretation rests on the assumption the nation is a psychological configuration that tells little about how discourses produce reality. In the book I understand amnesia in relation to public memory, which again is simultaneously collective and individual, but at least “public” places it in the domain of discourse. (Colonial) amnesia clearly operates on several levels: It can simply mean the repression of public memory of colonial history, that is, the awareness that the country ever had colonies. But

¹ Some authors and editors will claim indexing dogmas of publishers force the indexer to compile a list of names of people and places with little room for conceptual terms. This may often be the case, but here I am less interested in a critique of publishing culture and more interested in pursuing how indexing represents a way of weaving a pattern of ideas and concepts.
it can also operate as a proxy argument that separates colonialism from colonial history, which is again “amnesiised” from public memory. This double segregation means colonial history may be rediscovered (as it has been in every single former European empire), but it may not be understood as having any relationship to colonialism – the narrative of brutal subjugation, from enslavement to treatment as second-class citizen in the colonial state. Amnesia in this way can be understood as a way of opening up colonial history and colonialism to postcolonial scrutiny. But it may also operate as a strategy of containment – letting restaged colonial perceptions in the form of nostalgic narratives of lost histories and presences overtake or compromise the rewriting of the colonial encounter – that is “counter narrating”. Before accepting the argument that we need a plurality of voices in colonial rewriting, we have to remind ourselves that critical accounts of colonialism have yet to be fully written and embraced as mainstream narration in Europe. Stoler uses amnesia as a starting point for her critique of orchestrated forgetting and replaces it with “colonial aphasia”. In my book I stay with the term colonial amnesia, because in my reading it denotes precisely the loss of memory and the orchestration this process entails.

Anglo-centric is a term that according to the online Merriam-Webster Dictionary refers to “giving priority to England or things English”. The online Oxford Dictionaries extends England to Britain and provides the telling example, “An Anglocentric view of Australian history”. This example is poorly chosen as Anglocentric in this case refers to the preference of Australian historiography for identifying historical links to Britain over other links, as well as the notion of Australian identity as derived from those parts of its history given shape by British colonialism. The Free Dictionary is closer to my definition when it proposes “centered or focused on England or the English, especially in relation to historical or cultural influence” as its definition. Yet, also this definition only partially covers what I mean when I employ the term Anglo-centric because I use it exclusively in the context of postcolonial theory. And here it takes on a radically different meaning. It refers productively to the important work carried out for decades in postcolonial theory and postcolonial studies, which sought precisely to unravel the British understanding of its imperial-colonial rule as exceptional and benevolent – as a civilising mission. What has happened with postcolonial studies

and postcolonial theory, however, is that it has come to operate as a way of explaining imperial-colonial histories elsewhere in Europe. To speak of Anglo-centrism (as Ien Ang (1999) pointed out many years ago about Eurocentrism) is to understand that it is not a “swearword” or a reductionist accusation of singlemindedness. It is to point out that if postcolonial studies and postcolonial theory had evolved in Belgium or Italy we would have asked what happens to it as it travels to other sites/contexts/contact zones. That this has not happened with Anglo-centric postcolonial theory has to do with the privileged site occupied by English in the dissemination of knowledge more generally, and the status of English as a contemporary imperial language in particular.

Anglophone unsurprisingly overlaps with Anglo-centric, but “-phone” opens Anglo to a much broader and looser definition of things pertaining to the English-speaking world and of course the historically British dominated parts of the world. Some definitions of “-phone” discusses it in terms of language-use only. My working definition of the term for the book is to look at “-phone” in relation to domains. These can of course include, but not be reduced to, socio-linguistic concerns. Rather domains can be seen as the intersection of culture and language, that is, seen as given shape by the British Empire and its profoundly ambivalent and contradictory legacy. Anglophone postcolonialism is a massive and loosely defined field and in Postcolonial Denmark, I have deliberately not sought to engage the field as a whole, nor any of its battlezones, in order not to privilege the Anglophone postcolonial experience over others that might equally well be compared to the Danish case.

Anticolonial. In the book I use anticolonial in relation to resistance, voices, movement and struggle. As such, it remains a primarily descriptive term referring broadly to the strategies and practices engaged by colonial subjects from the moment of colonisation to the moment of political independence. In relation to the USVI (transferred from Danish to American rule in 1917), Greenland and the Faroe Islands it remains an open question when anticolonial can merit a relabelling as postcolonial. In postcolonialism more broadly anticolonial is seen as a way of recuperating voices of colonial subjects, who were sought silenced during colonialism. The debate on “subalternity” is deeply central to the discourse on bringing the “anticolonial” to the position of agency – rather than the mere site of registered resistance and reaction. Yet, in my book, anticolonial serves mainly the purposes of identifying counter-discourses to the master narratives of Danish colonialism, because the book is a critique of Danish self-perceptions shaped by their self-
interested discourse - from Enlightenment and civilising mission to neoliberal and militant adherence to Global North rule.

**Anti-immigration** in the book refers to generalised attitudes towards and policies directed against migrants and Global South mobility. It may be understood as one polarised position on a scale from anti-immigration, over assimilation to integration. Paradoxically in much Western discourse on migration, the opposite pole – unfettered immigration and emigration and no regulation applied to the migrant community in a host society (that in fact also needs to cease to see itself as a host community, but simply a reconfigured society shaped by (different) migrations)) – does not exist except in places where there are no societal structures (failed states), where the attraction for migrants is understandably limited. Thus, anti-immigration is typically understood as in opposition to a different earlier history it wants to do away with yet that ironically never existed. Not that there are not discourses – and even dominant ones – supporting immigration (from green-card to low skilled cheap(er) labour) but these are not premised on the idea that society will give sway to a new way of organising society as a multicultural melting pot. Even in societies built on large-scale migration, such as Australia and Canada, the policies that introduced the model of the multicultural society were built on conservative notions of preserving and protecting perceived homogeneous nations of Anglo-(Celt/Scottish) ancestry that already presupposed the writing out of other “multicultural” historical presences, particularly Indigenous ones. In Denmark, this history is necessarily different although the writing up of the nation as homogeneous in 1965 is also premised on the occlusion of earlier migrations, see also *populism*.

**Arctic.** One would assume that defining the Arctic is a relatively simple operation. But not necessarily so. As with Europe, the question where the Arctic ends is a question of disciplinary approaches. Natural science approaches will look at temperature range, ice conditions and a range of other phenomena. Political scientists will argue geopolitically. The reason Arctic is referenced in this book is because it covers an area that Greenland is both geopolitically and in terms of natural science approaches unequivocally a part of. Yet, singling out Greenland as part of the Arctic underlines its dramatically different situatedness from the rest of *Rigsfællesskabet*, and particularly its power centre – Denmark. In terms of colonial history, “Arctic” furthermore demonstrates the contrast between “tropical” colonies and colonies in the North Atlantic. Arctic denomimates the only populated major region with no political sovereignty paving the way for the encroachment of states and global corporations on a region protected mainly through self-serving remote governments.
Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland guarantees the Scandinavian country a seat at the table as a member of the Arctic states.

**Autonomy (political).** “Political”, though in parenthesis here, is crucial, because autonomy can mean many different things from individual to community level, some with a political dimension. Political autonomy signals the process of decolonisation that may be described as a process involving the passing of institutional power from a metropolitan or imperial-colonial centre to a marginalised group. But decolonisation as we know from Fanon, Ngugi, Mbembe and a long range of postcolonial intellectuals is as much a mental process, whose connection with the political institutional development is complex. One can argue it is difficult to conceive of political autonomy without an earlier process of anticolonialism, because political autonomy is not in reality granted, except formally, by the sovereign nation to a marginalised/colonial people. What postcolonialism teaches us through its writer-activists is that autonomy is claimed and represents a first difficult step in a process ultimately designed to lead to sovereignty that entails far more than a narrowly defined political process.

**Benevolence.** One of the few terms I devote some space to referencing, because it is a central conceptual rather than descriptive term. It draws primarily on the Anglophone discourse on benevolence as a post-imperial defence strategy, that is, seeing the British Empire as defined by good intentions by implicit contrast to other empires, typically the Spanish and the Portuguese, whose global influence Britain, conveniently for this narrative, replaced. In comparison with other postcolonial revisitings of the colonial past elsewhere in Europe, benevolence never really caught on in the way “exceptionalism” did. The difference between the two terms relate partially to their emphasis on well-intended although possibly undermined by bad(ly executed) actions (benevolence), and the importance of nuancing critiques of colonialism (exceptionalism), which as I point out in the book often come to operate as a nuancing of an implicit (overly strident) critique of colonialism. It remains a mystery where this strident critique emerged as a mainstream narrative anywhere in Europe. Benevolence draws upon notions of dissemination of Enlightenment and the spread of the “civilising mission” as possibly partially compromised but in the final analysis well-intended and well-executed ideas, leaving the predictable flaws apparent in the colonial and postcolonial world squarely with the “locals”. I have made use of benevolence primarily because it captures better than exceptionalism the Danish late colonial strategy in Greenland.
**Black/s.** The first issue to consider here is whether to use, and if to use, whether to place the term in inverted commas. This orthographic consideration is squarely linked with the question of how to represent deeply racialised others in the colonial contexts on the one hand, and with current forms of marginalised migrant groups, or groups considered migrants. One recent example is the attempted “repatriation” of people from the Windrush generation in the UK. In older texts, where using the term black, at times interchangeably with “negro”, was considered a norm, much as it is in much current Danish “oral” discourse, I have kept the terms as presented in the original texts without inverted commas, in spite of the often latent if not manifest racialised discourse they draw upon. There is in Denmark as in the Netherlands, Iceland and Sweden a convoluted discourse on what to do with still popular mainly children’s literature and very generally labelled “colonial paraphernalia” that continues to be reproduced, and when questioned on racial grounds, defended vehemently. While this score is easily settled – it all has to go – it is much harder to decide unequivocally what to do with the historical racialised remains – “the period pieces”. Are they also to be removed because they are considered harmful and offensive to “black” and “coloured” children and their parents, or do they need to be re-presented as an offensive archive, requiring “us” to critically revisit our constructions of “innocent” pasts and childhoods, and to remind “ourselves” that even if this is done, there remains another fight to be taken up: To fight against (re)newed constructions of racialised others – from perceived subservient Asian domestic workers and wives to precarious migrants working in badly regulated parts of the constructions industry and so forth.

**Border zone** is at once a metaphor signalling a transitional zone loosely connected to geopolitics and a liminal geographical space, signalling an overlapping territory between dichotomously understood zones. Here border zone is intimately connected to representation and to conceptualisations of belonging and unbelonging. Borderlands, which also occurs as a term in the book, refers specifically to discourses surrounding Eastern European notions of border zones caught up in post-Soviet articulations of national selfhood.

**Civilising mission** is a concept pertaining to colonialism at a particular stage – the creation of the colonial state – or more broadly, a term capturing the idea of colonial repression walking hand in hand with the idea of offering an autonomous space to colonial subjects. Civilising mission hinges on colonial subjects submitting themselves to what the coloniser understands as benevolent governance, guided by political rule and religious instruction. The term has never been embraced in Danish colonial scholarship. It is not inconceivable this is connected to an anxiety that Danish
colonialism can in fact unproblematically be situated inside European colonialism at large. My purpose with singling out precisely this term is to draw attention to the pan-European phenomenon of the “civilising mission”, which is nonetheless understood primarily as a peculiar national-imperial variant that does not require the realignment with the broader discourse. But there is also a deliberately temporal argument in my usage of the term. Civilising mission, from its political-religious multi-pronged strategy of containment and domination during the colonial era can be traced through the era of decolonisation and may be said to reemerge as a Danish strategy shortly after the end of the Second World War. Now it is Denmark as a democratic, welfare state society seeking to spread its gospel across the Global South through development and of course through the deeply instrumentalised attitudes saturating the modernisation programs in Greenland in the 1950s and 1960s. It also has a military wing where it comes to inform Danish defence and foreign policy, increasingly entangled from the 1980s. In this variant, civilising mission preaches free speech, democratisation, empowerment of women, and human rights, while operating simultaneously as a justification for Denmark’s adhesion to American-led military adventures in Western Asia, and European led aggressions in Northern Africa. Finally, civilising mission is internalised as a process of dealing with postcolonial subjects migrating to the post-imperial metropolitan centre. Thus, rather than seeing civilising mission reductively as an aberrant anachronism from the colonial era, it is the continuity of a metropolitan perceived selfhood producing the indisputable right to inform, command and demand through its self-perceived enlightened ideals and practices.

**Colonial.** Colonial occurs as a number of compound terms: administration, aftermath, archive, council, exhibitions, empires, historiography, history, possessions, remains, rule, subject and world. Colonial is of course also related to colonialism, postcolonial and postcolonialism, to decolonial and decolonisation. In Danish scholarship colonial has overwhelmingly been understood in terms of an era, and as such a phenomenon associated with (past) colonial rule. In international scholarship it is a far more open term, often not predominantly understood in terms of temporality, but as a condition shaped by power relations produced and shaped originally by colonial powers, but continued in the aftermath of colonial rule in restaged forms of control and containment. This broader conceptualisation disturbs Danish narratives of the colonial in two overlapping ways: Firstly, it enables the renarrativising of the Danish colonial relationship as precisely colonial, albeit now without merely referring narrowly to colonial rule. Secondly, it does away with the possibility of segregating the colonial from the postcolonial as two consecutive historical eras. Greenland is of course the most striking example of a continued colonial relationship, where the colonial is
procrastinated through the renegotiated Danish presence in Greenland on primarily Danish defined terms. Even as this takes place with a decreasingly Danish territorial presence, when Greenland “takes home” - as the Danish expression goes - more and more of the domains of government institutions. This reading has consequences for a number of the compound terms listed under the entry. “Colonial administration” in the book is used as a term to describe the Danish colonial rule during the colonial era, which in Greenland finishes in 1979 with the introduction of home rule. Yet, not all areas were immediately “taken home” nor was this completed with the introduction of self-government in 2009. Furthermore, Greenlandic home rule and self-government continued to be reliant on Danish “benevolence”, on the recruitment of Danish civil servants in local government and more broadly in Greenlandic institutions and private companies. Danish continued as the privileged language at the top of hierarchies in Greenland. All of which raises the question why this represents a postcolonial rather than a colonial presence.

**Colonial aftermath** is a term used alongside colonial legacy in the book that speaks to the long shadow cast by a colonial administration and its culture, yet to be fully replaced in Greenland. Where “aftermath” suggests a trail left after the formal end of colonial rule, “colonial legacy” signals traces, remains and in this sense more the idea that many years after the end of colonial rule and no continued Danish formal presence (such as in the USVI, Ghana and India) nor economic dominance (in contrast say to the British influence in Zimbabwe and the Caribbean) legacy works as a way of restaging the colonial relation both for domestic consumption in the metropolitan centre and in the “postcolony”. Both terms also suggest unfinished business, say of having closed the books on colonial suppression, by moments of reconciliation and reparation.

**Colonial archive** is both a very specific term referring to a set of images created during the colonial era, and a term referring to the legacy and aftermath of this era. In *Postcolonial Denmark* I am not really interested in discussing archives and their contents and how they may be opened up for other non-white/deracialised/subaltern etc readings through different approaches to their significations. I am more interested in colonial archive as a metaphor and as a reminder of the importance of how the colonial archive worked as a repository of images - understandings – representations – to be readily drawn upon when called upon to serve colonial rule and underpinning the civilising mission. This is relevant of course in terms of how the colonial – as an archive – operated as a distorted mirror of an immaculate self that never had to be described, but was unquestioningly reflected through the asserted intrinsic unreliability, inferiority and constructed social-cultural-biological
difference of the other. The importance of this operation, however, in the book is less about revealing the racialised discourse of the colonial era and more about how the colonial archive is recycled and restaged for other relations after the end of colonial rule.

**Colonial empires** is at first glance a contradiction in terms. Yet, empires can exist without colonies in its modern historical sense where race is inscribed into the colonial-capitalist economy. But colonial empire also underlines that some of the European nation-empires while not as extensive as the British or French nonetheless understood themselves as entities in a similar fashion.

**Colonial historiography** in the book contains two central aspects. The first is its problematic reliance on “white” sources, accounts, narratives, perspectives etc. Something which is becoming extremely belatedly recognised in Danish colonial historiography and partly taken into consideration in *Danmark og kolonierne*, which I discuss in the book and elsewhere (see references in relevant places). Colonial historiography is here related to Jean and John Comaroff and Stoler’s anthropological interventions into the historians’ traditional hold on the colonial archive and its meaning. Yet, how differently would colonial archive be approached if it was simply relabelled as “white archive”? The second central aspect is the relationship between colonial and national historiography where again we see a belated recognition of the impact colonial possessions may have had on national history and self-perception. Belated and one should also add hesitant. The closer colonial historiography is aligned with the “nation’s history” the more relevant becomes the question why the will to subjugate, the preparedness to commit atrocities against people of different colour in the colonial world should be separate from people’s attitudes in the metropolitan culture. But also, the question from where comes the certainty that this has actually changed? Why did it change? How did it change and when did it change? Here of course the cut-off dates with the “tropical” colonies operate as a convenient vanishing point into an ever more distant past, yet why are “we” then back in exactly the same three places? It is also where the alignment with Greenland (and to a certain extent the Faroe Islands) is an interesting disturbance, because the question of colonial historiography requires through history’s obsession with “era” or “epoch” that we establish a cut-off date with colonies that are yet to be sovereign, and whose relationship with Denmark has indisputably remained troubled until now.

**Colonial history** unsurprisingly shares overlapping concerns with colonial historiography. What needs to be added to the entry above is primarily the problem of the discipline of History’s claim on the right to define what it is. Internationally, of course interventions from a number of fields have
questioned not History’s right to use its methodologies (even if it privileges written over oral sources with self-evident consequences when it comes to unpacking the colonial archive), but that History defines the parameters of colonial history. Thus when *Danmark og kolonierne* even with its largely token inclusion of non-historians projects itself as a standard reference work for decades to come, it contributes towards the cementation of the disciplinary hold. It becomes a defence of the discipline not of that which it seeks to investigate.

**Colonial rebellion** may immediately appear to be a given descriptive term. Yet, it is singled out for two reasons. First of all, it shows colonial subjects’ agency had a pattern, rather than the customary dismissive accounts of largely spontaneous, poorly organised, misdirected violence – a representation that stems directly from colonial authorities’ desire to quell the rebellion and its underpinnings. Secondly, colonial rebellion is also interesting because of its separation from other forms of rebellion, not least, workers’ rebellions – and even strikes. While there is a need to recognise the annihilistic characteristics of organising labour under enslavement, it is equally pertinent to address the overlaps between different forms of worker oppression leading to rebellions. The rebellion leading to the emancipation of the enslaved in the Danish West Indies in 1848 makes the case for the links between rebellion and political freedom – which are again interconnected with human and workers’ rights.

**Colonial remains** belongs to the same territory as legacy and aftermath, so why a third term? Remains is the more physical attribution to that which was created during the colonial era. It can of course easily be understood more metaphorically, but the point in the book with using the term is primarily to assert the importance for example of remnants of colonial buildings (typically those belonging to the Danish administration/establishment), which can be “rediscovered” and rebuilt as has been the case in all three “tropical colonies”. But, I also use remains in a different way as a way of naming the parts of the colonial world (not only in the Danish case) that “failed” to be decolonised/emancipated. Using the term in this context underlines that if you never ceased to be a colony, why then should the relationship no longer be understood as colonial?

**Colonial rule** is applied in a relatively straightforward manner to refer to how Danish administrations in the colonial world ruled over local colonial subjects. Its main importance lies in dismissing a Danish tradition for using Danish titles for various positions in the colonial administration *in lieu of* a terminology that immediately sets the context of their presence as colonial. The Danish priesthood which had such a strong presence in the Danish colonies are of
course integral to colonial rule, even if they in many situations saw themselves in opposition to the self-serving Danish colonial administration. Thus the entry is entangled with the “civilising mission”.

**Colonial state** is a particular form of colonial rule instigated during the era of high imperialism where the European empires sought to consolidate their presence through the creation of institutions based on racialised hierarchies. In the Danish case a formal colonial state was never really formed, partly because the only remaining Danish “tropical” colony during high imperialism, the Danish West Indies, were under sale for decades from the end of enslavement in 1848. Some attempts were made for example with the establishment of a colonial council in the West Indies, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, while Icelanders saw precisely the dangers of a locally recognised Danish presence and insisted on its own local assembly, even as it was denied formal influence, until the Icelanders forced the Danes to recognise increasing degrees of autonomy.

**Colonial subject** refers to the people in the territories Denmark controlled. In the book, the term “colonial subject” primarily works as a way of characterising what they are not. They are not Danish citizens, because their society has been colonised and hence they do not have or share sovereignty, but also because they are not recognised by the colonial power as citizen “material”. “Civilising mission” here becomes an important term because it navigates between a dismissive characterisation of the colonial subject and sees itself as offering “embryonic citizenship”. The difficulties in writing a book that primarily interests itself in a critique of performing nationhood and statehood “abroad” lies of course in the vocabulary that then also produce the people and their subjectivities through what may be termed a distorted mirror in reverse. That is, much as the book points out and clearly recognises agency and anticolonial and later forms of resistance, these are not the primary subject matter of the book, because the book is about the projection of a white, racialized and colonialist selfhood. It would be of great benefit if accounts written from the localities by historical and contemporary voices could be collected from across the Danish former colonial empire.

**Colonial world** in my book refers geographically and historically to the parts of the world dominated through the era of European colonialism. Historically, this becomes a loose term because this could include Columbus’s arrival in the Caribbean and New Caledonian efforts in breaking French rule today. Geopolitically, it is equally loose since it begs the question whether Europe’s relationship with China and Thailand could be considered colonial? How formal and how dominant
is the relationship required to be in order to be characterised as colonial? In spite of its looseness, however, I find the term useful as a way of gesturing beyond the specificities of colonial relations that always threaten to become subjected to narratives of exceptionalism and benevolence. Finally, the inevitable looseness attached to such terms is equally demonstrable in relation to established terms such as “the West”, “Global North/Global South” and its now largely redundant predecessors “First World” and “Third World”.

**Colonialism.** There is no end to the number of attempts to definitively define “colonialism”. Perhaps, inevitably so – its controversial perception often arrives exactly at its moment of articulation. In *Postcolonial Denmark* I make no attempt to give an upfront definition of the term, yet it should be clear from its many appearances in the manuscript that it is one of the book’s most central terms. So, instead of giving yet another definition of the term, I will state how the term is employed in the book’s narrative. Colonialism – other than signalling there is something “colonial” at stake – is a conceptual term that captures the desire and power to control, rule over, exploit and manipulate “other” people(s). “Other” is of course also a slippery term because does “other” simply mean the representation of non-selves in the power relations outlined above, or does it refer to people(s) resisting their inclusion or refusal of inclusion on the basis of their perceived difference? Colonialism is in this book perhaps primarily important in signalling a contrast to colonisation, which defines a more clear-cut almost physical idea of taking over someone’s territory and exterminate or displace and disperse the original owners/custodians.

**Colonialism’s culture** is Nicholas Thomas’s term that I find particularly useful to underline how colonialism is much more about culture than economic-materialist accounts perhaps allow for. To be seen to be superior grants a degree of cultural self-assuredness - which sheer non-justifiable exploitation only with reference to the ability to do so - does not. Colonialism’s culture, however, also speaks of the cultural encounter (what Pratt discusses as the contact zone) where not only two cultures meet in an asymmetrical power relation, but where something new also arises. Yet, this new, which arises, is given shape by the power relations built on colonial ideas, since the encounter cannot escape its parameters, even though it challenges the notion that because it is an asymmetrical relation one culture escapes unscathed while the other is destroyed (the fatal impact thesis).

**Coloniality** is usually invoked as a term replacing colonial and postcolonial with a condition highlighting that the era of oppression is not only historical. In some ways, its current form (neoliberalism pushed through by the Global North) is as strident and destructive as earlier forms of
colonialism. Some scholars also invoke “coloniality” to mark a dissatisfaction with what they see as limitations in using postcolonial as a term to address continuity and change. Since I employ the term, postcolonial, I do not share these reservations. The usage I make of “coloniality” in the book is more limited but not less important, where it represents a condition – primarily in the Danish context in the continued Danish presence in Greenland, but also more broadly as a contemporary way of thinking “colonially” about the places where Denmark had a colonial presence. Not dismissing the postcolonial as a productive term (as some scholars tend to do) I also employ the term, postcoloniality (see this).

Coloniser is simultaneously a descriptive term referring to colonisers’ settling (and often displacing in the process indigenous peoples) in what the coloniser perceives as virgin land, or in the case of Australia terra nullius (unoccupied land). Only in the Danish West Indies is it possible to speak of this form of colonialism in the Danish context, as the other colonies were trade posts, administrative and religious centres, but not settler colonies. Yet, coloniser in Postcolonial Denmark is primarily understood in its broader conceptualisation as characteristic of those who are willing to subjugate, displace, eliminate and exterminate “colonial subjects” and replace the order of the pre-existing society with a colonial order. Coloniser in the literal sense has been used in Danish scholarship as a way of dismissing the idea that what Danes were doing was colonising, since they precisely did not settle – even in the case of the Danish West Indies plantation owners were not primarily Danes but formed part of a broader European “creole” elite. Thus coloniser in the book is a central term connecting different experiences across the Danish colonial domain.

Commemoration tends to be understood in much scholarship in a relatively narrow way as the act of commemorating or the celebration/marking/observing of past events. In Postcolonial Denmark I employ the term more loosely to describe the difficult process of remembering, forgetting and restaging of memory which often has only a loose connection with the actual historical past. With what knowledge do thousands of Danes travel to the USVI annually? How can a curiosity of a past, or reawakened past be understood when these people are by and large ignorant of that history? In the chapter on Danish war films “commemoration” serves in similar ways to raise the question about the relationship between the private and the public. How is the private commemoration of families who have lost members in the war theatres in Western Asia connected to the “nation’s” commemoration of loss on the recently installed national flag day?
**Competition state** is one of a series of terms describing the current order of the neoliberal state in the Global North. It highlights the process of privatising profitable entities in the public sector while debt-laden sectors remain public, thus contributing to the long-term undermining of the nation-state unable to service its debts as it simultaneously erodes the taxation base by handing tax relief to affluent parts of society. One way of interpreting the competition state is to see it as an important tool in neoliberalism’s toolbox. The term is intimately connected with the concept of nation-branding and nation-(re)building.

**Constitutional change** as a term requires little explication. The reason for its inclusion here is to highlight that it is typically understood as endemic to the nation-state. Yet it is intrinsic to my argument in *Postcolonial Denmark* that constitutional change in Denmark cannot be understood in isolation from its repercussions for Denmark’s colonial domains (in 1849 and 1953), and events in the colonial world propelling constitutional change. Yet, in Danish scholarship and public discourse on constitutional change that typically occurs around Constitution Day, it is regarded as an exclusively Danish affair. This is an interesting occlusion as acknowledging ramifications beyond Denmark and from beyond Denmark would go to the very core of Danish national identity, built on the idea that the constitution enshrines Danish values and as such bears out Anderson’s notion of the sacrality of the nation.

**Contact zone** as employed by Mary Louise Pratt is a central term in the book, because it captures the dynamic yet power-relations determined nature of colonial encounters. Interestingly enough in Pratt’s *Imperial Eyes* at times without any colonial subjects being present. In *Postcolonial Denmark*, contact zones are not always colonial, pre-colonialism encounters between Vikings and Inuit and Native Canadians and postcolonial contact zones where Danes encounter USVI’ers are two examples of dynamic encounters where colonial is unhelpful. Though Danish tourists visiting USVI represent a revisiting of a colonial relation, most of the people they will meet are not descendants of people enslaved by Danes or people from plantations in the USVI. And the Danish colonial relation came to a stop in 1917 and was re-established as a US-USVI colonial relation. Yet, the postcolonial contact zone may still operate as a way of reenacting the colonial encounter, even if those encountering are not descendants of Danish administrators and descendants of Danish enslaved.

**Crisis** is a concept so entangled that it requires its own book. In *Postcolonial Denmark*, however, crisis works primarily as a way of framing overlapping processes of coming to terms with an altered
reality. Crisis in its most narrow conceptualisation points at a pattern of failing to contain the “other” through narratives of superior white selfhood posited against an inferior non-white other – as a colonial subject or as a postcolonial subject. Colonial history and narratives can no longer be told from the exclusionary position of the Dane and the Danish academic alone. It is met with contesting narratives that put pressure on the notions of an immaculate white selfhood. Similarly, the contemporary postcolonial subjects arriving and living in Denmark and Europe, even if often subjected to horrendous forms of barring them from arriving, nonetheless continue to arrive and stay. This creates a sense of crisis in the contemporary Western/European/Danish subject. Crisis also manifests itself in relation to Denmark’s presence and attitudes to Greenland, where Greenlanders openly challenge the Danish comfort zone of having always had the best of intentions regarding its colonial and “postcolonial” policies and presences in Greenland. Crisis is also in the book related to the failing welfare society that is part of the core narrative of a nation that has built its wealth (exclusively) on domestic determination. This is again tied in with the fear of the Global North becoming the Global South, a fear that then seems to become accentuated through the appearance of Global Southerners in the metropolitan centre.

**Critical race studies** is one of a number of fields that have provided insights for my work. The lack of attention to racism and racialisation in Denmark generally and in scholarship more specifically until quite recently means that fields overtly engaged with the question of “race” deserve particular attention. “Race” has not generally been embraced across postcolonial Europe until fairly recently, but as a way of engaging differently with European societies and their relationship with the colonial and “ex-colonial” world, it has a longer history. One could argue as long as the life of the colonial contact zone that takes us back to the beginning of colonialism. Part of the difficulties in working through a critical race studies perspective is its origin in US race discourse, history and experience. Productively, the insights it has produced in the US context are useful for reflections also in a postcolonial European context. But Europe is not the US nor is its relations with its “colonial world” the same as a primarily domestic US discourse on race relations. It is important to note that on both sides of the Atlantic, the work of Frantz Fanon has been of huge importance for critical race studies and postcolonial European critiques. But equally important there are also many influences prioritised differently in European and US scholarship. This also has to do with the relations anticolonial voices understood themselves as rewriting – Caribbean, African, Asian writers wrote back to the empire. In the Danish context, because of the relative small colonial populations and the early losses of the “tropical” colonies, there is not the anticolonial continuity say of Caribbean
intellectuals writing back to the British, French, Dutch and Spanish empires for example. In terms of the North Atlantic colonies, the white settler colonies of the Faroe Islands and Iceland would match better discourses on settler colonialism (Canada, US, Australia, New Zealand), while the Greenlandic anticolonialism/postcolonialism for convoluted reasons and strategic deliberations has focused on Indigenous discourse.

**Cultural difference.** The short version of defining “cultural difference” is to refer to the work of Stuart Hall and Homi Bhabha. There are many other relevant scholars but Hall’s work on the dangers of the “reification” of culture on the one hand and the need to better recognise the processes through which colonial/postcolonial subjects become marginalised on the other hand is extremely useful for making operational a prism through which these complexities can be unravelled. Similarly, Bhabha’s work sheds, among other things, light on how cultural differentiation is at the core of nation and empire building.

**Decolonisation.** What decolonisation means, depends on who you ask. In mainstream political science and its neighbouring fields, decolonisation simply means colonial subjects taking over the structures of their society as they become a sovereign nation. To neo-colonialists it marks the process where colonies cease to be ruled directly by colonial powers complete with a cultural apparatus under the auspices of the “civilising mission”, becoming instead postcolonial subjects ruled indirectly by monetary international institutions orchestrated by the Global North and the economic and military interests of global powers. But to postcolonial and decolonial scholars decolonisation represents also a mental process (as discussed by Fanon and Ngugi) where the colonised needs to shed the internalised discourse of the “civilising mission”. Both decolonial and postcolonial scholarship, however, also point to the urgent need for a similar mental process to be carried out in the former metropolitan centres. The core of the work on postcolonial Europe aims precisely, through for example the deconstruction of benevolence, exceptionalism and white innocence, to draw attention to what gathers speed during the process of decolonisation (here understood in its historical-political variant) in the colony, occurs with a belatedness in the metropolitan centres. This is unsurprising because decolonisation goes to the core of national selfhood and entails the dismantling of historical as well as “inherited” privileges.

**Development aid.** A term describing the transfer of money and expertise from the Global North to the Global South. To post-development scholars, a process demarcating the transition from a European based global power system to an American(-Soviet) – Pax Americana – based on
continuous exploitation. But in the book it refers also crucially to the idea of development aid as a recasting of the “civilising mission” now for the time of economic liberalism (1950s-1960s) and after that - neoliberalism. This primarily economic modernity driven account however needs to be accompanied by an account of the particular “culture” which inscribes development aid in a narrative of Global North superiority and Global South inadequacy, flaws, laziness, unreliability, corruption and so forth.

**Emigration.** In the book emigration refers to Danish and European emigration to the colonial world. I draw attention to European emigration as a reminder that those immigrants coming to Europe in recent decades do not arrive in a vacuum, where Europeans remained stationary until the moment of their arrival. There is a deeply paradoxical narrative operating here, where immigrants seem to become a new Columbus arriving while unsuspecting ‘natives’ (Europeans) go about their daily business until suddenly interrupted by migrants. The massive emigration from Europe has been completely obliterated from the current discourse on immigration into Europe.

**Empire-nations.** Nationhood and national identity have been understood overwhelmingly as domestic affairs inside the territory “proper” of the nation-state. Yet, we know historically there are very few example of static borders over centuries. In the book, however, “empire-nations” refers to the fact that the nation-states which were also empires understood their nationhood both as territorially confined but also as an identity-sharing cultural formation – an invitation to the colonial subject to belong in a circumscribed manner, provided s/he lived up to the criteria defined by the civilising mission. What is important to this broader definition of what identifications are offered by the empire-nation is the recognition that colonial subjects can in no shape or form be seen as offering anything in return – other than surrendering their allegiance to their own culture. In this way current forms of nationalism can be seen as imploded empire-nationhoods, where colonial subjects have migrated to the metropolitan centre (Algerians to France, Indonesians to the Netherlands etc), only to be met with discourses of non-belonging and questionable loyalties. This also applies in broader indirect colonial-metropolitan migration – such as people from Western Asia, North Africa and the Middle East to Denmark – but also in the case of more ambiguously racialised others, such as southern and eastern European migrants to northern and western Europe.

**Enlightenment.** When was the Enlightenment, or where is the Enlightenment? Both questions illustrate the notoriously slippery questions and answers surrounding this concept. Or is it less a concept and more a philosophical discourse, or is it a historical period forming central ideas about
European selfhood, whose legacy continue to shape current academic and intellectual discourse around postcolonial Europe. The discourses informing interpretations of Enlightenment are in this book more central than any attempt let alone desire to define or determine what Enlightenment is and was. Such desires are inevitably compromised by the ideology to which they subscribe.

**Enslavement.** Has for some time now replaced the term slavery as a better way of capturing how enslavement is a process where someone enslaves someone else. It is no longer a descriptive term referencing a catalogue of horrors committed in service of colonial profiteering which involved political and religious establishment across Europe.

“Eskimo”. Is now broadly recognised as a derogatory reference to Inuit people(s). Yet it persists in popular cultural references in Denmark (such as the ice cream Giant Eskimo), betraying once again how the self-image of the Enlightened citizen stands in stark contrast to ignorant platitudes that are remarkably rarely criticised, and presumably coming from the same Enlightened citizen. The reaction that critics are patrolling linguistic freedom comes up with remarkably frequency.

**Exceptionalism.** Over a few years, exceptionalism went from being a rather obscure and non-recognised term of reference to become a widespread term referring to the practice of condemning colonialism in an abstract form while arguing for the need to be “more nuanced” when dealing with one’s own particular empire formation. As a way for rivalling empire-nations to condemn colonialist practices of others, it has a really long history. Condemning other colonial powers without applying the same degree of critical scrutiny towards one’s own practices became the defence by implication of the nation-empire. It appears interestingly enough also in contemporary scholarship claiming to be postcolonial. One of my reasons for embarking on region-based approaches to the postcolonial – say among Nordic countries – and for working comparatively across nations with colonial-imperial experience – has been to avoid the traps of looking for best intentions. These are of course not only produced by imperial master narratives of the time, but reproduced in later scholarship eager not to be seen to be too critical of the nation’s past.

**Exploitation.** A term which captures unequivocally the brutal reality of colonial rule and colonialism. Exploitation of course also has a particular history in Marxist and neo-Marxist interpretations also of the colonial-imperial relation. It is virtually non-existing in mainstream European writing on colonialist practice and on the postcolonial relationship with the ex-colonial world, for example in the institutional literature on development aid. Paradoxically, it emerges in
literature on why Scandinavian countries can participate unproblematically in development aid, because they had no colonies “to speak of”.

**Gini coefficient.** A measure of equality/inequality. To people working in the humanities this is a fairly uninteresting term. Nor does it occupy a central space in the book. Yet its inclusion draws attention to a fact that escaped significant parts of postcolonial scholarship (and other critical interventions) for many years. If we want to understand asymmetrical power relations we need to understand how they are produced by capitalism also. It is conceivable to write an entire book on Denmark and its relations with the world beyond Europe as a localised critique of capitalism in its various historical stages from mercantilist colonialism to neoliberal (neo)colonialism, a development that can appear linear and circular at the same time. Such a book would probably not have postcolonial in its title. Including gini coefficient as a way of measuring the evolution of inequality in my book, helps explaining how the concentration of capital, which is what growing inequality produces, can be linked to notions of in the Danish case nationhood understood as homogeneous culture and language, whiteness as protected privilege, and the idea of wealth or affluence produced by the common domestic good. All of which can be undermined by migrants seeking to exploit our welfare system and calls for reparations as attempts of the undeserving to shortcut access to what is set aside for the deserving Dane.

**Global intervention.** I am using this term instrumentally to prevent the segregation of various global interventions into epochal compartmentalisation. The latest form of Danish global intervention – aid in various forms and military intervention – should be seen in terms of its continuity and difference from earlier forms of intervention whether in the 1950s, or the colonial era. I am not positing an ahistorical argument, rather I am asking why no historical continuity has been explored when there are at the very least instrumentalist and metaphorical overlaps.

**Global North and Global South.** In the literature I draw upon these terms have replaced First and Third World, because of their affiliation with the Cold War. Global North and Global South are also more geopolitically loosely understood terms, since although the affluence based on a country by country approach does bear out a geographical distinction, clearly there are a number of exceptions to the rule. Even more importantly, however, is the acknowledgement that Global North and Global South are intertwined in a number of ways, and not only in the predictable way of North wielding influence and power over South. The Global South can be identified at the very heart of the Global North – around the corner from the finance centres that are the epicentres of the Global North.
Similarly, there are extremely wealthy pockets in the most poverty-stricken zones of the Global South.

**Greenland.** The world’s biggest island and the most likely candidate in the Arctic for sovereign nationhood. It is paradoxical that while its towns and small communities all have Greenlandic names (where Greenlandic names have taken precedence over Danish names after 1979), the country itself remains referred to internationally by the Viking misnomer, not as Kalaallit Nunaat.

**Greenlander.** The simple question what and who is a Greenlander, let alone why even use the term requires a complex answer way beyond this short entry. In this book, “Greenlander” identifies everyone who lives on the island (and those identifying as Greenlanders living abroad not least in Denmark), in contrast to Inuit in other parts of the Arctic. Greenlander also provides a focus on the enormous influence wielded over Greenland by Denmark, in similar ways to how Canadian and Alaskan Inuit need to be seen in the context of their colonising centres to the south. The term Inuit is furthermore used in the book where the focus is more on the notion of a shared Indigenous identity with other Indigenes primarily in the Arctic, and as testimony of the tenuous relationship between different groups of Greenlanders resulting from the Danish influence.

**Guest worker.** The limited use of guest worker in the book - in contrast to migrant and immigration - is due to the preferred international terminology often less tainted than national definitions where derogatory forms of majoritarian society representation of migrants quickly make problematic any change of denominations. Guest worker serves mainly to identify the early short period (mid-1960s-early-1970s) where the latest wave of migrants began arriving to fill vacancies in the Danish labour market. There is a variety of labels attached to migrants through the decades following the “guest worker era”, but I have been less interested in these as the point in the book has not been to write a history of contemporary migrancy, but instead to demonstrate how a pattern of representation surrounding migrants is established and subsequently reproduced.

**High imperialism.** The historical era where colonial states were formed and the European rush to complete its conquest of the colonial world reached its zenith, is typically dated 1870-1914. Denmark’s complete defeat first by the British navy in Copenhagen and then the disastrous military campaigns in Schleswig-Holstein are domestic reasons explaining the Danish colonial demise in the “tropics”. The consolidation of the Danish presence in the North Atlantic was too late to include Iceland, and too late to merit the label high imperialism in relation to Greenland and the Faroe
Islands. Danish late colonialism shares more with the failed attempts of European colonial powers elsewhere to restore colonial rule after Europe’s isolation from its colonies during the Second World War.

**Home rule** is a limited form of self-government introduced in the Faroe Islands in 1948 and in Greenland in 1979. Increasingly seen as an era term capturing one of the important stepping stones in both countries’ protracted process towards autonomy and sovereignty.

**Immigration.** A descriptive term applied to people migrating from another country. Interestingly, Danes migrating to North America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are in Danish scholarship conceived as emigrants, and Danes migrating to Greenland are not seen as migrants at all. Thus immigration and emigration though descriptive terms, are deeply embedded in normative perceptions. Just as migrants from the Global North to other affluent sectors of local Global South economies or Global North societies are described as ex-pats.

**Indigenous people.** In its descriptive form it is a self-ascribing term. Yet, it is inevitably also caught up in problematic logics of representations dating back to the beginning of colonialism. Hence before 1788 technically there were no Indigenous peoples in Australia and before 1721 no Indigenous peoples in Greenland. It was the European presence that rendered them Indigenous. It has also become a term employed by global institutions, not least the UN, offering people who subscribe to this label a space outside the sovereign nation-state to which they officially belong, but in extremely few cases control and in many cases have no influence over. The probably most notable case in the Danish context is that of the displaced Inughuit people from the Thule area and their procrastinated process of having their violated rights acknowledged by the Danish state.

**Inuit.** Refers to Indigenous people(s) in the Arctic. In this book the term is used mainly when Greenland and Greenlanders are less seen in a nation-building context and more as recipients of a broader colonial encroachment on the Arctic as a whole, or neo-colonial military and neoliberal forms of “scrambles for the Arctic”.

**Islamist.** Mentioned only once in the entire book. Who would imagine one could write an entire book on Denmark’s “global relations” past and present without devoting an entire chapter to understand the Danish current international and domestic intervention as a reaction to Islamist movements. A point of critique for some and a moment of considerable relief to others.
Legacy (of the colonial/colonialism). Legacy is less about the trail left by the end of colonialism (aftermath), less about physical objects and structures which may then subsequently be rediscovered (remains) and more the issue of how to deal with colonialism’s unfinished business. Legacy is then for example about the administrative culture’s structures in contemporary Greenland. In Denmark it is primarily about the contradictory position of not wanting to come to terms with colonialism and the simultaneous desire to show to ourselves and others we were “out there”. Legacy also consists in a more concrete form, the legacy of Karen Blixen (as somehow less of a settler colonialist), Peter von Scholten (as Enlightened emancipator). More broadly across these two more specific definitions colonial legacy may be understood as struggle over how and what colonialism comes to mean.

Migrancy. I have chosen a number of different words to signal “the space of the migrant”. Migrancy indicates a condition, rather than person (migrant), or process (migration). There are no clear boundaries between the three categories, but the need to speak differently about “the space of the migrant” is due to the deeply entangled processes of understanding what exactly is being referred to - does migration refer to the migrant or to the reaction to the migrant? What does person refer to - the view from and on the migrant - and condition, for example, migrancy is what gives shape to modernity, even as it is also embroiled in capitalism and coloniality.

Missionaries. When I first began to look for connections across the Danish colonial domain, missionaries (and a mobile administrative culture) was my first discovery. Second discovery was how little space Danish scholarship had devoted to understand missionaries as part of a pan-colonial phenomenon. Third discovery, which was not really connected so much to the Danish case, was how difficult European and settler colonialism scholarship have found it to write critically about what this intervention did to local cultures. Perhaps, somewhat more surprising in a Danish non-religious normativity, yet only until one reminds oneself how the legacy of religious Protestantism saturates Danish culture.

Modernisation programme (Greenland). Replaced Danish colonial rule in Greenland yet made Greenland at least initially more overruled than ever before. Paradoxically, it paved the way for changes in Greenlandic society giving anticolonial voices an unintended platform, where they became more difficult for the Danish-Greenlandic establishment (in Greenland and Denmark) to ignore. Interestingly, modernisation suggests colonial rule as being static and outdated – yet it was the Greenlanders whose modernisation was called for. Colonial modernity towards the dying days
of colonialism is a pan-European trope, but the extent in the Danish case was different, just as it is important to remind oneself that colonial modernity elsewhere died with decolonisation – which of course never took place in Greenland.

**Moral panic.** Is a term stemming from the 1970s to describe “white” anxiety when faced with rebellion from the postcolonial subject against his/her condition in the metropolitan centre. What I found fascinating is its clear overlaps with earlier forms of moral panic, for example in connection with revolts by enslaved (1733 and 1848) and the workers’ rebellion on St. Croix in 1878. As such it is tied in with my reading of “colonial archive” and orchestrated “colonial amnesia”, but also connected to Wekker’s discourse on “white innocence”.

**Multicultural.** A term, I have used sparingly in the book. Multicultural in its adjectival form refers to the fact of the presence of a diversity of cultures. “Multi’s” association with diversity has of course led to critiques of its inadequacies in terms of relating “cultures” not only to diversity but also to difference. For the same reason I have used “multiculturalism” sparingly, because of its association with a particular form of policy making, pioneered by Canada and Australia in the 1960s and 1970s. A policy, which for all its dangers of entrenching certain traditions – essentialising conservative cultural norms - nonetheless opened spaces in a dramatic fashion in deeply entrenched settler colonialism driven cultures. In Denmark multiculturalism as a policy never happened. The country went straight from its non-application to its imagined dismantling.

**Nation-building** is a term associated with the process of building a coherent national community after decolonisation. So, typically a project for the Global South. Yet, when I began to think through the phases of Danish history that were connected to globalised processes, I was struck by how similar the process of forgetting and remembering post-1945 was, also in other war-affected countries. Secondly, the nation-(re)building in European post-empire-nations that actually overlapped with post-war reconstruction, suggested strong links with constructions of nationhood in the Global South during the same period.

**National imaginary** is inspired by Anderson’s concept of the nation as an imagined community. My preference for a different term is to distance my analysis from some of the assumptions in Anderson’s work and possibly even more so from his disciples. My term situates my conceptualisation between Anderson’s imagined community and Taylor’s social imaginary, which he acknowledges is inspired by Anderson’s concept. What I have been interested in demonstrating
is that the “national imaginary” operates as a repository of understandings, images, representations not unlike the colonial archive in its metaphorical sense. I wanted to move away from the term “community”, because even if it is in Anderson’s words “imagined”, this is not to be understood as “imaginary”. “Imaginary” is less directly aligned with a community-based approach, and more concerned with discursive formations producing the imaginary as community-based. It is not that it becomes more or less “real”, it is to emphasise how meaning is produced through power-relations - typically by people in central positions (dominant media, political discourse, or less helpfully labelled, public discourse). Institutionalisation provides powerful structures with channels of articulation, but behind it all are people – not ever more abstract levels of power rendering us all incapacitated.

**Nation narration.** Originally made famous by Homi Bhabha’s edited volume (1990) it drew attention to the then unrecognised fact that the nation is continuously reimagined and what brings about this reimagining is the process of narrating the nation. The constant assertion of who we are, what we are particularly concerned about, is inseparable from the concept of the nation as an imagined community, but also the erection of scaffolding to support the constant (re)building of nationhood. What is so paradoxical about this possibly trivial insight is that the nation narration rests on the notion of the timelessness of the nation, even as it constantly revises itself to reflect the dominant concerns of the age.

**Nationalism.** Back in the early 2000s, this was nearly a swearword. Or certainly dismissed with reference to the global processes about to make it redundant. Yet, nationalism has not only survived the “globalisation era” (which we have of course had in other forms before, not least in the colonial era). It has reasserted itself as the only proper identitarian logic for understanding who we are, in a stridently homogeneity promoting way unmatched – since the 1930s in Europe. The underlying question, whether nationalism is always bad, is more difficult to answer. Is nationalism not a necessary component to build a cohesive Greenlandic society in its process of becoming independent? In the case of metropolitan cultures, including Denmark, it seems to me that nationalism is inevitably caught up in majoritarian discourses of whiteness and authoritarian national selfhood – as such it belongs more in the basket of problems than solutions.

**Nationhood** is in this book primarily inserted instead of nation. Nationhood represents a way of drawing attention to the essence-driven conceptualisations that define “nations”, without accepting there is such an essence. Dictionary definitions here reveal their limitations with some focusing on
nation as opposed to state, others homing in on the homogeneity of a nation with too little attention on the alleged nature of its underpinnings.

**Neoliberal(ism)** refers very simply to the process of replacing nation-state as the redistributor of society’s goods and services with the market. It also makes the citizen into a subject responsible for his/her own fate in a society where he/she has less and less control. Beyond the nation-state neoliberalism encourages every bigger concentration of capital in the hands of ever fewer individuals. Neoliberalism as an ideology not only seeks to determine the “value” and “worthiness” of the individual, but as was seen with the Global Finance Crisis, whole societies such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. Of course, Structural Adjustment Programs had already wreaked similar havoc in the Global South, but things are only seen to have material consequences when they strike the Global North, because here they strike societies that clearly were not meant to be targeted. If Nigeria is struck then Kenya can be struck. But if Greece is struck why not Britain or Denmark?

**Non-European other.** This convoluted expression is hard to be proud of. But how else does one capture the differentiation between patterns of representing “others”. “Non-European other” of course refers to representations, thus many non-European others may simply be Danish or Italian citizens originating, or through their ancestry originating, from the Global South.

**Nostalgia.** There is a range of approaches to nostalgia in a variety of fields. At one end of the scale nostalgia is an emotion associated with a longing for an irretrievable past. If the past could in fact be consummated (not once again since nostalgia is about reconstruction not merely a desire to revisit) nostalgia would be annihilated by the reencounter with the past. At the other end of the scale nostalgia is a deliberate strategy for reappraising the past according to contemporary self-projections. Colonial nostalgia, particularly in a Danish variety, where the colonial is situated overseas, is at one level simply a retrospective desire for a different time and place. Yet, that past is clearly also an identitarian relation between a former imperial self and a colonial other. Colonial nostalgia in this sense is different from national nostalgia. The difference in place and time in colonial nostalgia enables a profound degree of ahistorical and placeless identification enhanced by the lack of surviving colonial links. A different way of phrasing this is to point out that the colonial can be restaged or re-enacted with a considerable degree of imagination. Who will counter the restaging and re-enactment when the particularity of that history is barely remembered, or has been overtaken by other later and hence more present colonial realities?
**Parochialism.** In the book, it is a sharpening of Chakrabarty’s pointed critique of provincialising Europe. Parochialism is not only a way of addressing the myopic nationalism of the present that haunts Western societies. It is also a historical point to draw attention to how the universalism that Europe projected in the Enlightenment co-existed with a parochialism that enabled the enormous blindness with which Enlightenment Europe projected itself onto the colonial world. This point is particularly important as the current reaction to borders and walls is to bemoan a loss of a time when we were open and better, while it seems quite often the point is more to do with the loss of “our” control over the world.

-**phone.** I use the term, which is really not an established term in relation to all former European empires, to describe the cultural affiliation, tension and resistance created by the notion of belonging to a broader language-culture, inevitably placing the former European metropolitan culture at the centre. Of course, there are marked differences to note. Danish language and culture really only has a current connection with the former North Atlantic colonies, and less convincing in relation to Iceland. The centres of Spanish and Portuguese language and culture are no longer Spain and Portugal, even if they continue to hold a unique position and imagine themselves as centres.

**Plantation (economy)** in this book refers to the enslavement system and its legacy as a particular form of colonial capitalism. The end of slavery does not finish the plantation economy just as the emancipated slaves continue to live in many cases under appalling conditions and of course without the compensation for their stolen labour, whereas plantation owners were deemed to be worthy of compensation by the state. Plantation economies also appear in other forms in many places in the colonial world, typically structured by indentured labour. Again it is a cause for reflection that labour conditions in current plantation economies can be equally appalling. This point is important because it underlines that we are not speaking of an atrocious form of colonial labour extraction that can be isolated to the past. Thus current plantation economies obliterates the desired (historical) distance to colonialism.

**Populism.** I use the term mainly in the context of contemporary anti-migration discourse. Yet, populism is not a new phenomenon, nor is it the re-manifestation of sentiments from the 1930s, even if links in the way of speaking and targeting vulnerable groups are apparent. Populism is a form of rhetoric and political discourse that could equally well be seen in simplistic reproduction of
trickle-down effect economic discourse that has little empirical base. Yet, this is not considered as populism, so there is a normativity operating that casts particular approaches as populist and others, because they are mainstream, but not necessarily more convincingly based, are not placed in such categories.

**Postcolonial critique.** In the book, it is a form of critique that draws upon the postcolonial as the prism informing the perspective. It can also be understood as an academically discursive terrain that has become established in the decades the postcolonial has been around.

**Postcolonial Europe** is a way of approaching Europe on a continental, regional and national level as a discursive terrain that has emerged over the last decade and one that insists that Europe’s multiple crises are entangled with Europe’s unacknowledged colonial history, reproduced for the contemporary in the shape of the crises over migrants, whiteness as a “threatened privileged space”, a questioning of an alleged, inherent European superiority founded on its self-perceived universal intellectual history.

**Postcolonial studies** refers to the field of postcolonial studies. A field which is derived from Commonwealth studies and hence an Anglophone interrogative field that began with literature and essays on Commonwealth culture, but which also drew upon colonial experiences outside the Anglophone world, not least through the space allocated to the Francophone literature and anticolonial writings. Thus one could say postcolonial studies always had an interest in non-Anglophone experiences, but rather than seeking to explore what they might mean in the context they were written, focused on how they could be recruited for a postcolonial (Anglophone) critique. Thus the evolving term of postcolonial Europe can be understood as a way of recognising on the one hand the contribution of postcolonial studies to think through postcolonial relations elsewhere, while on the other hand drawing attention to the limitations inherent to any field that interests itself mainly in the postcolonial in relation to Anglophone experiences.

**Postcolonial subjects** is a term I employ in the book to speak of the continuities stemming from colonialism and its “colonial subjects” (see this). In the book I speak of continuities in the Danish governmental and popular attitudes say to Greenlanders, yet those Greenlandic subjects cannot be reduced to colonial continuity, unless one wants to dismiss all Greenlandic processes of achieving voice and agency as ineffectual. Adding “postcolonial” is a way of capturing continuity and break as an entangled process of containment and emancipation. Postcolonial subject is also a way of
referring to contemporary forms of migrancy and presences of “others” in Denmark, originating in places that Denmark had no formal colonial relationship with, but that still captures the point that Denmark in a broader pan-European sense was implicated (as I illustrate in the book) in European colonialism at large, and that this is perhaps anyway more formative in shaping the postcolonial world than concrete imperial-colonial relations between specific countries.

**Postcolonialism.** Is preoccupied with the question of the legacy of colonialism. As such, rather than merely a continuity or a break, postcolonialism captures the tension between continuity and break. It is of course also a term that necessarily begins with the assertion that colonialism’s aftermath shapes our contemporary world beyond the mere traces of the colonial. Thus postcolonialism is also a prism through which we may understand contemporary Eastern European anxieties over their European belonging even though they were clearly not colonies. But postcolonialism also helps explaining how the colonial archive has come to define also how Eastern Europeans see the contemporary migrant as racialised.

**Postcoloniality.** As with coloniality, postcoloniality is a condition. A position arrived at, but one might also say a trapped position. The positive spin on the term would emphasise that amnesia has been replaced by recognition of the importance to understand the postcoloniality for example of Denmark. Yet, it is also trapped in the sense that there is nothing really beyond the post – once the post disappears then coloniality is also exhausted. To arrive at postcoloniality requires recognising, and producing as central to national discourse, the reality of colonial history as a nation informing process.

**Postcommunism.** Describes the era after communism but using the term may also be a way of signalling unfinished history from the time of communism. Thus it entails the same continuity and break narrative as other “posts”, such as postcolonialism and postmodernism.

**Post-development.** In international discourse, and here really only in parts of the literature on development, post-development marks the work to include insights from the postcolonial field; in Escobar’s pioneering work in the field particularly the work of Edward Said. It is important to note that it coexists with a number of other terms such as neo-colonialism and neoliberalism both of which are also concerned with the power relation discourse in development and its literature, but which are only indirectly interested in the role played by culture.
Procrastination (policy) is a term I invented to capture the particular form of Danish colonial rule and postcolonial intervention in its former colonial world. It is not necessarily unique to Danish rule, but it is remarkably unrecognised and understudied in the Danish context where it remains so prevalent. It refers to a particular strategy of containment (of the colonial/postcolonial subject) through a strategy of endless deferral. It reflects the moment where the colonial power can no longer overrule the colonial subject’s insistence on influence but is still capable of deferring the actual transfer of power, influence, sovereignty etc.

Race in the book appears both as a designated field – “critical race studies” and as a broadly defined way of approaching relations between an imperial and postcolonial/post-imperial Danish self and its colonial and postcolonial subjects. The challenge of writing about race in a globalised Denmark context is that it is, on the one hand, one of the foundational pillars defining Danish attitudes, while on the other hand it has remained a taboo subject in Danish culture – since the 1950s. Before the 1950s manifest racism for example in the daily routines of the media but also in academia was regarded as unproblematic. With the rise of the international critique of racialised Western/European attitudes and their colonial structures, race and racism disappeared in its manifest institutionalised forms, but clearly continued as an undercurrent. Otherwise, how are we to understand its rapid reappearance in the era of populism that in the Danish context can be traced back to the 1980s, but which rose to political prominence in the 1990s. The Danish process of coming to terms with its racialised discourse in the present and past can be linked of course to other post-imperial countries in Europe, but also to deeply racialised discourses that have risen in Eastern Europe. It is of course important to note that while racism is a constant in European history since the Renaissance and hence the beginning of colonialism and enslavement in “modern times”, racism undergoes a number of transformations. From the questions of how to deal with the “discovery” of new humans in the Americas in the wake of Columbus, over the requirement to place the enslaved as a sub-human category to justify a dehumanising practice. This in turn paves the way for biological racism, to eugenics and finally to its contemporary form where culture has replaced biology, even if the visual clearly continues to operate as a marker of threatening cultural difference.

Reconciliation in the postcolonial Danish context refers to the urge to address, recognise and move beyond the repressions caused by colonial and (post)colonial Danish rule in Greenland and the USVI. Reconciliation has a convoluted history in the UN and other international – and national -
political fora, but also in academic literature, from more psychological inspired approaches focusing on the need to heal the “wounds of the past” to very direct political forms of activism aiming to force the former colonial powers to acknowledge their indefensible actions and recognise the need for reparations.

Reenactment is only mentioned in a few places in the book, but I have sought to characterise it in two overlapping forms. One is the direct reperformance of important acts – in the Danish context this entails the re-enactment of the declaration of emancipation by Governor von Scholten in 1848. But I am also using it more broadly to illustrate how we can understand the desire to resurrect and preserve Danish colonial buildings typically belonging to the then colonial establishment, which are now restored to former glory and invites (Danish) tourists to revisit a moment of past (Danish) global (colonial) glory.

Restaging (colonial) is a term I pioneered for this book. There are a number of related and overlapping terms connected with forgetting, repressing the memory of, amnesia, colonial aphasia – yet when it comes to the processes where the post-imperial nation once again arrives on the (post)colonial scene of its former colonial rule, there is no term describing this activity. It could of course be labelled as a neo-colonial practice as I also discuss in the book, but restaging is, albeit driven by economic power (the ability to be there as a sizeable presence to be reckoned with), and (white) privilege, also a term that encapsulates what is cultural, historical, contemporary, renewal, future-oriented in a way that terms associated with vanishing pasts do not.

Restoration is both used literally (restoring colonial ruins and relations), but also associated with restoring the reputation of a previously tainted post-imperial nation, that is, the contemporary privileged former imperial white nation seeking to make amends for its wrongdoings. Amends, however, are always tempered and compromised by maintaining the position colonial misconduct was trivial, customary and always mitigated by benevolence, misguided altruism. It is difficult to see, how restoration could take place within the idea of a colonial project that can be postcolonially rescued through the excavation and rebuilding of the colonial establishment’s physical remains. But it is also impossible to ignore colonial history as violence against colonial subjects and that the contemporary restoration projects are characterised by asymmetrical power relations which are in fact the result of colonialism’s exploitative project.
**Rigsfællesskabet, Danish Commonwealth.** I have not been able to detect when the term was first applied or who it was developed by. However, it is the current officially acknowledged term by all three partners (Denmark, Greenland, Faroe Islands) to describe the relationship between a sovereign nation-state and its two autonomous territories united under the Danish Crown, but also under the sovereignty of the Danish state. *Rigsfællesskabet*, though not designating Denmark in its name, is a Danish term, not Faroese or Greenlandic, and it replaces the time when Denmark was formally colonial ruler over the two North Atlantic territories. The term thus recognises Denmark is an insufficient label to cover all of the Danish realm, but at the same time its notion of “common” or “shared” community is betrayed by the Danish state’s overriding concern to protect Danish interests.

**Scramble for the Arctic** is a term used in a particular book title and from there became a more broadly endorsed way of seeing the neoliberal scramble for resources in the Arctic. A project that has become held back after the Global Financial Crisis, but which will rematerialise as global powers and corporations run out of resources in other parts of the world. In the more specific Greenlandic context it relates to Greenland’s search for alternative sources of income to the subsidies from the Danish state, which many Greenlanders argue prolongs the historical, asymmetrical power relations with Denmark. It refers indirectly to the colonial Scramble for Africa, thus as a term signals the same exploitation motifs governing global powers’ approach to the Global South. Denmark missed out of this earlier scramble, but through its sovereignty over Greenland, appears adamant to make the most of its current position as an Arctic power.

**Self-government** is a specific term that designates the current form of rule in Greenland and the Faroe Islands. As such, the term remains applicable until the day of independence. But self-government also represents a contrast to earlier forms of Danish colonial rule (Faroe Islands -1948, Greenland -1979). Thus the term is also connected to notions of citizenship and the autonomous subject which as categories have been notoriously slippery terms when applied to Greenlanders and Faroese in Denmark. Hence, they are not recognised as minorities as they are considered citizens, but nor do they have the same entitlements as Danish citizens, thus once again the label subjects (to her Majesty), or perhaps postcolonial subjects in some ways better capture their positions.

**Settlers, European.** Danish colonialism did not primarily take the form of settler colonialism. There were no Danish settlements in any of its tropical domains, and in terms of a broader conceptualised European settlement in the Danish territories, only the USVI are relevant here. In the
North Atlantic the situation is even more ambivalent. All three later colonial domains were settled not by Danes but by Norwegians albeit at a time when the category of nation makes little sense. In Greenland they died out and when the Danes recolonised Greenland only administrators, traders and missionaries settled because of the Greenland’s glacial environment. In Iceland and the Faroe Islands, descendants from the Vikings continued to live, but again a very limited number of mainly colonial establishment figures settled. Thus the discussion over settler colonialism which has become a major field in Anglophone postcolonial studies in recent decades is of limited relevance – except for the attention it devotes to forms of local displacement (physically as well as culturally) of Indigenous populations where Greenland constitutes a partially overlapping parallel. The USVI was a plantation economy society and as such did not match settler colonialism’s preference for farming communities on Indigenous land and the governmentalities which accompanied them.

**Slave trade** occupies a central place in the book’s more historical chapters because of its importance for Danish colonial history and for the Danish economy at the time. It is also there, because of the belated and still often reluctant way of dealing with the end of the slave trade as other than the opportunity to portray Denmark as a pioneering nation in its abolition. What is also significant are the few sources elaborating on the building up of slave trade and Denmark’s role in this. Finally, it is important to discuss the Danish involvement because of a curious tendency to focus on Arabs and Africans’ role in slave trade – typically emphasised by scholars who have done little to detail the European participation in the trade.

**Soldier.** For a nation that didn’t see actual war participation for almost 140 years the category of the soldier may appear as a peripheral figure. In the book, the soldier materialises as a category for three interrelated reasons. The first, because he is the centre around which the current militant nationalism is built. Hence Denmark now has a national flag day to commemorate those who lost their lives sent on public missions. The fact that is under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence reveals its priorities. Secondly, because of the recent militant nationalism, the soldier in previous wars (1864) and the Second World War is rehabilitated. The latter as someone who actually fought – in very few skirmishes – but as an addendum narrative to the construction of the Danes who fought through active and passive resistance against the German occupation. The former as a figure representing ordinary people caught in large-scale politics and, interestingly enough, belligerent nationalism. The third way is the completely obliterated existence of Danish colonial troops who were engaged in keeping colonial administrations in command. As such the soldier under alien
skies can be connected from Afghanistan, Iraq and Northern Africa to the Gold Coast, Danish West Indies and Tranquebar – and of course when called upon - in the North Atlantic.

**Southern Europe/ans** appear in the book as manifestations of questionable, liminal Europeans, because of their racialisation as non-whites, or not quite whites. This is tied at crucial moments to their “underperformance” as Europeans, projected as bad colonial masters against good colonial masters (a prevalent British (post-)imperial narrative), as economic squanderers (threatening the good project of the EU/Europe), and as porous border zones allowing unwanted others to “flood in”.

**Sovereignty.** Its history as a clear-cut term in political science/IR is also its problem. Sovereignty is both a Eurocentric designation of a territory’s indisputable integrity with reference to its international recognition, and a way of recognising power as absolute. Even within the conventional limits of Political Science/IR this is not the case – as evidenced by the spurious self-legitimation of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But sovereignty, also more broadly conceptualised, has become a term that refers to the integrity of subjects and groups of subjects that do not have formal sovereignty over their territories - yet. This includes, for example, the entire Arctic region. Thus my use of sovereignty is meant to problematise status quo arguments referring international territorial agreements, when they were and are in fact territorial violations (such as Palestine and “Kurdistan”).

“**Third World**” invariably appears in inverted commas, unless it refers to the period of its widespread usage. It refers to the Global South when the world was divided into East and West – but actually also then South. Its explicit hierarchisation of “worlds” can be understood as referring to how it was conceived at the time, yet “Third World” was never really embraced by those who were supposed to inhabit it, who favoured other labels such as the Non-Aligned Movement.

**Thule** refers to the settlement established by the Danish-Greenlandic explorer, Knud Rasmussen, in the early twentieth century. The etymology of Thule as the ultimate place of human settlement to the north signals its peripheral designation, but also its inclusion into the world of recognised habitation. Thule is a deeply contested area because it is Danish territory excised from Danish sovereignty to the US military, and as such represents a similar terrain to Guantanamo in Cuba. The Thule people, Inughuit, are now recognised as an Indigenous people, a partial consequence of their
claim to compensation from the Danish state because of their enforced removal in 1953 to make way for the expansion of American activities at the Air Base.

**Tourism, (Danish colonial)** is in different ways an apparent contradiction. How does one travel to the Danish West Indies when they have in fact been the USVI in the last 100 years? But Danes also travel to Ghana and the former trade posts in India in similar fashion to French tourists visiting Puducherry (formerly the French enclave Pondicherry), Vietnam and Cambodia, just as Namibia is high on the German tourists’ kick-the-bucket list. Colonial tourism can be just that – colonial – since it can be an unreflected nostalgic trip to a place whose history most Europeans have in fact forgotten, or if they remember it, it is hardly its history as a destination for enslaved and indentured labour and European violence. But colonial tourism can of course also entail less easily contained cultural encounters on local premises – even if the asymmetrical relations are often as striking as during colonial times.

“**Tropical colonies**”. In spite of its exotic connotations it remains a descriptive category in Danish scholarship and public discourse referring to the Danish colonies in the tropical zone, but also as an often unacknowledged reference to the fact that there were also Danish colonies outside the tropics – in the North Atlantic. As a term it easily lends itself to nostalgic, paradisiac representations, rather than the brutal economic system it actually was, let alone the way these colonies cut short so many lives.

**Violence (colonial)**. An entry that could be dealt with very rapidly, simply by referring to Fanon’s famous essay “On Colonial Violence”. It appears as a term that emphasises the need to look beyond the veneer covering colonialist representation and contemporary preference for using occlusive language and instead recognise colonial violence as unmitigated violence and will to violence executed by Europeans against colonial populations. It needs to be reiterated because it is continuously undermined, ignored for example by urging European scholars to go beyond what has never been established as a mainstream narrative.

**War films (Danish)**. A cluster of films that have risen to prominence alongside a rising militant nationalism in Denmark post 2000. War films can of course deal with war zones, and with the repercussions on the “home front”, and typically Danish war films do that. In the book, which is the first place Danish contemporary war films are discussed collectively, I have been particularly
interested in how films about the Second World War and the contemporary war theatres coexist as reflections on Danish attitudes to war entanglement.

**Welfare societies/state, Nordic/Scandinavian.** In international scholarship, liberal society and welfare society are used interchangeably to describe a range of societies with very different degrees of welfare, with very different degrees of equality and very different welfare society histories. Inside this heterogeneous multitude, the Nordic countries occupy a perceived homogeneous space of extensive equality spread over a comparatively protracted welfare society history. In the Danish context, the welfare society is considered unrelated historically to colonialism. Yet the wave of eugenics which struck European societies in the decades leading up to the Second World War, where racialisation was underpinning both Nazi Germany and imperial Japan (and those who fought against the Japanese), is one place to look for colonial regimes of thought influencing European thought as Europe lay the foundation of their modern welfare societies. In the specific case of Denmark, the modernisation of Greenland and the rise of development aid concurrently with the rise of the post-1945 rise of the welfare society are clear illustrations of a differentiated approach to what welfare means and entitles you to, depending on a racialised perception of a welfare deserving “white” self and never quite modern enough Global Southern other. This is one place one could begin to look for parallels to the current process of dismantling welfare societies in response to a neoliberal driven demand for privatised profit regimes. An aspect of the current process is the fine tuned Nordic welfare apparatus being turned on the people it was originally designed to help. And here, the conspicuous non-deserving welfare recipient is singled out with reference to racialized -masquerading as cultural - difference.

**The West.** Alongside other terms such as “Third World”, the West is in many contexts increasingly being replaced by Global North, as an economic affluence and inequality driven perception of the shifting landscape of global geopolitics and asymmetrical power relations. The West also relates to notions of the post-war Pax Americana driven discourse of the liberal West in stark opposition to the communist East. Arguably then, it is primarily a period term which has been overtaken by new power formations. Yet, when employed in the book the West is not merely as a historical reference. It draws attention to how power relations and cultural normativity mutually influence each other. “Western” culture remains a considerable factor in, for example, attracting migrants from the Global South, not least driven by the Western culture industry’s continued saturation of the global media landscape. Admittedly, this is changing as witnessed say by K-pop, Bollywood films and
Brazilian telenovellas’ global appeal, but it lingers on well beyond the increasing provincialisation of Europe and North America on the global scene.

**White.** “White” intersects with a number of other terms – particularly race/racialisation, postcoloniality/coloniality and post-imperial – and similarly to these other terms it enables a particular reading of aspects of global Denmark. To speak of “white” and “whiteness” is to speak of the invisibility of power – or rather to point out that power grants the definitive right to determine what becomes visible under what circumstances, and what remains invisible. “White” is a normativity precisely because it is not called upon to define its contours – its self-idealisation operates through its ability to continuously question the spectrum from “Black” and “Brown” to not-quite-white. This is one way to explain why “whiteness” continues to operate as an aspirational form of belonging. Hence in the book, I have used “white” both as a self-ascribed normativity – a categorisation with an implied counter-category of the “non-white” or “not-quite-white” – but also as a qualifier of already established critical terms, say “white moral panic”, instead of simply moral panic, which refers to a majoritarian society’s anxiety over losing its privileged position, but adding “white” places this squarely in a racialised perception. “White” furthermore operates as a way of connecting the colonial with the postcolonial, for example, the resurrection of a dormant whiteness in the postcolonial encounter with the formerly colonial and now postcolonial subject. Whiteness is also a projection for example from the postcolonial to the colonial with nostalgia as its vehicle of identification.

**White innocence.** The title of Gloria Wekker’s study of the Dutch unwillingness to come to terms with their colonial history and their colonial and postcolonial subjugation and vilification of racialised others. What prevents this recognition is the self-ascription of “innocence” protected by the majoritarian society’s power not to address its own “whiteness”. White innocence is then a variant on “benevolence” and “exceptionalism”.

**Zones of non-being.** Santos’s notion of the abyssal line, Bauman’s concept of the vagrant to describe the Global South migrant are terms that seek to address how coloniality, as a permanent condition rather than as an historical era lingering on beyond its temporality, captures how colonial (era) power relations continue to shape the “modern world”. Zones of non-being have arguably become even more entrenched in current modernity – or globality – as evidenced by the spiralling global inequality, accelerated by economic boom and bust periods alike. Zones of non-being furthermore captures how colonialism’s project - to conduct warfare against other modes of
existence among other peoples and against nature itself through raw exploitation - rather than a receding phenomenon after the end of colonial rule, has in fact intensified and is currently accelerating through neoliberalism’s destructive machinery.

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